US missiles are ‘too little too late’ says former NATO official

Krishnan Guru-Murthy: This new permission is very limited and very late. What real difference does it make?
Fabrice Pothier: As you say, I think this is sadly too little, too late. And this is part of a long series of decisions that have been constantly behind the curve in terms of responding to Russian escalation. And clearly, we don’t get the full picture, but it seems that the US decision is only for the Kursk Oblast perimeter, which leaves again this logic of giving the Ukrainians just enough to fight, but always with one hand tied in their back. So I would say there’s a symbolic value to the decision. There’s a kind of new threshold. We will have to see to what extent the UK and France are supporting this with their own cruise missiles, long range cruise missiles. But the reality is that in the quantitative logic of this war, it’s not going to fundamentally change the Ukrainian position.
Krishnan Guru-Murthy: Russia rudely talks about America and its satellites, meaning Britain and France and others in Nato. But when you look at the decision making, it’s hard to see that they’re wrong. I mean, if Britain and France wants to give Ukraine more permission to use the weapons that they send, why can’t they? Is it that America just calls the shots?
Fabrice Pothier: We see the US from a qualitative and quantitative point of view is indispensable in making the key decisions in how to support and how to manage this war. The problem here is that we are dealing with a US administration that has been, in my view, overly worried and overly thinking all the possible escalation options. And by the time it has concluded that somehow escalation can be managed, Putin is already escalating with other means. So unfortunately, we have that dependence on what Washington says and does. And you’re right. It ties our hands also in how the other capitals, especially London and Paris, but also Berlin, are willing to do.
Krishnan Guru-Murthy: Right. But when Trump is in power and the disagreements in strategy is much more pronounced, will it still be the case that Britain, France and Germany do what they’re told? Will it have to be the case?
Fabrice Pothier: I think you’re making an assumption that I don’t fully subscribe to. I do not necessarily think there is a fundamental disagreement between an incoming Trump administration and Europe. I think the incoming Trump administration seems to have some, I would say, some right instincts on what to do with the war. First to finish the war, to end this war, which is obviously very important, especially for the Ukrainians, but also to try to inject some strength and leverage to move the key disruptive actor here, which is Russia. And I will call on the European governments not to sit and wait on what Trump is going to do, but try to do a Trump-compatible strategy and embrace it and try to shape the terms of a deal.
Krishnan Guru-Murthy: I mean, that sounds optimistic, but when you look at what Trump junior says today, it’s much closer to the Russian position than it is to the European.
Fabrice Pothier: You’re right. There are lots of divergent voices and often voices that are against the logical interest of Ukraine and of Europe. But there are also voices around Trump that are, I would say, more sensible and more aware that the bad deal will actually look bad for Donald Trump. So I think he’s got every interest to have something where Ukraine can hold on the long term rather than something like Afghanistan, where you would have a collapse on his watch. And he doesn’t like to look bad.